INTRODUCTION

Nuclear testing in Australia
Three series of nuclear weapons tests were conducted in Australia from 1952 to 1957. Three tests (Hurricane, Mosaic 1-2) were carried out at the Monte Bello Islands, off the north-west coast of Western Australia. Two tests (Totem 1-2) were carried out at Emu Field,~100 kilometres north of Maralinga in South Australia, and seven tests (Buffalo 1-4, Antler 1-3) were carried out at Maralinga (latitude 30.2000°S, longitude 131.5833°E) (1) . There is an extensive public record on these tests and their aftermath. A comprehensive history of the tests has been published (2) , and the public health effects for the last seven tests from Australia-wide monitoring data have been evaluated and reported (3) . The report (3) collated measurement data of fallout deposit (in Appendix B) and activity in air (in Appendix C) and sketched the paths of clouds containing weapons material for all tests (in Figures 6.2 and 6.4). The Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Committee (AIRAC) presented a comprehensive report (4) (the AIRAC 9 report), and a Royal Commission (5) was held in 1984-85 to enquire into the impact of the test programme.
Global fallout levels in the southern hemisphere have also been summarised (6) . Several detailed studies of the ionising radiation doses received by personnel working on the Australian testing programme, and possible related health effects, have been carried out. In addition, a major health impact assessment and cleanup of the Maralinga site was carried out (3, 5, (7) (8) (9) (10) and more assessments have been carried out since the time of the cleanup (11) (12) (13) .
Possible (inadvertent) exposures
At the time of the tests it was assumed that no members of the public would be exposed to significant levels of ionising radiation as a result of any of the tests, as all members of the public had been warned to keep well clear of the possible path of the radioactive plume from each detonation. However, it was subsequently established that there were a number of Aboriginal people camped at Wallatinna Bore,~170 kilometres northeast of ground zero, when the Totem 1 explosion took place at Emu Field at 07.00 local time (21.30 GMT (Greenwich Mean Time)) on 15 October 1953. They later stated (14) that a 'black mist' rolled through Wallatinnã 5 hours after the Totem 1 detonation, and that some of them became very ill within a few days. More details have been given (2) (pp. 73-75) on this episode, which came to light about 1980.
THE 'BLACK MIST' PHENOMENON
The evidence that the 'Black Mist' occurred on the same day as the Totem I test is largely anecdotal, and was treated with scepticism by scientists when it was first reported.
The definition of what is meant by the term 'black mist' can only come from the anecdotal reports, which indicate that a dark grey dust rolled through the landscape. In the words of an Aboriginal who experienced the phenomenon on 15 October 1953, 'this smoke, you know, you could see it between the trees coming through, it went right through, over us. Could smell the gunpowder smell. And on the tent it had this grey blacky sort of dust'. This evidence does not seem to suggest that the 'black mist' at Emu was particularly oily in nature, although two personal accounts to the 1985 Royal Commission (4) describe the cloud as 'sticky dust' and 'greasy' (paras. 6.4.13 and 6.4.15). There were similar anecdotal reports of a 'grey mist' following some of the early Nevada atomic weapons tests.
A technical assessment of the anecdotal accounts and possible radiation doses to Aboriginals in the Wallatinna area due to radioactive fallout from Totem I was presented in the AIRAC 9 report (4) published in 1983.
Wallatinna is 173 km from the Totem I ground zero at Emu. The early path of the fallout from the Totem I test probably passed close to Wallatinna based on wind direction. It was estimated in AIRAC 9 (4) that the fallout cloud would have passed near the Wallatinna station~5 hours after the detonation of Totem I (i.e. around midday).
The estimates of dose rate at Wallatinna in AIRAC 9 (4) were based on ground and aerial surveys of fallout from Totem I along the centre line of the fallout path. The worst-case dose estimate was 9 millisievert (mSv) accumulated over 2 weeks from fallout at Wallatinna. This was for external exposure to gamma radiation and took no specific account of any beta radiation dose to the skin from immersion in a ground-level cloud of radioactive fallout (such as could result if the 'Black Mist' phenomenon was radioactive fallout).
AIRAC pointed out that doses of this magnitude are within the limits recommended for members of the public by the International Commission on Radiological Protection at the time of the tests (15) . An accumulated dose of 9 mSv is approximately five to six times the average annual dose to Australians from natural background radiation. The AIRAC conclusion was that the radioactive fallout from the Totem 1 atomic test carried out at Emu could not have been the cause of acute (i.e. short-term) illness or the early death of Aboriginals at Wallatinna or nearby.
The conclusion of the 1985 Commonwealth Government Royal Commission (5) was that Aboriginal people at and near Wallatinna experienced radioactive fallout from Totem 1 in the form of a black mist or cloud (para. 6.4.92). Detailed modelling of the dispersion of the Totem I fallout cloud was undertaken by UK AWRE (16) and presented to the Royal Commission. While there were many variables, the modelling did not rule out the possibility of a 'Black Mist' phenomenon.
The Royal Commission (5) examined these UK AWRE dose estimates and came to the overall conclusion (para. 6.4.60) that 'the external beta radiation is not very penetrating and only causes a dose to the skin. The total skin dose, for someone with no shoes and not washing, is very much less than the dose required to give slight skin reddening'. The largest estimate of beta equivalent dose to the skin (assuming no removal of deposited material by washing, and no absorption of radiation by clothing) was 170 mSv.
The assessment in AIRAC 9 (4) recorded that people became ill some days later. Symptoms included sore eyes, loss of sight, skin rashes, coughing, vomiting and diarrhoea. AIRAC 9 also noted that an unspecified number of persons are said to have died as a result of the passage of the mist (para. 14.4). This was also suggested by Lennon et al. (14) . All of the evidence for health impacts before AIRAC was anecdotal and there was no corroborating evidence available on the association between the health effects/deaths and radiation exposure.
Aim of this study
The aim of this present work is to re-examine whether the people camped at Wallatinna bore could have received radiation doses, due to the passage of this 'black mist', that could have been high enough to cause the symptoms described and discussed (4, 5, 14) . No attempt is made in this work to discuss the mechanism(s) which could lead to such a 'black mist' phenomenon.
The radiological problem
The overall radiological problem is summarised in Figure 1 .
The source term used in this work is based on the published approach used to determine doses to Australian military personnel involved in the British nuclear tests in Australia (12, 13) . This source term is the mix of radioactive fission products and contaminated material produced by the nuclear detonation (13) . It was assumed that this material was carried downwind at a velocity sufficient to allow for its arrival at Wallatinna 5 hours after the detonation, as reported.
The calculations allowed for a number of effects as the contaminated material was carried downwind. These included dispersion, deposition on the ground surface, radioactive decay and ingrowth of decay products.
The people camped at Wallatinna left~24 hours after the passage of the cloud through the area, and were therefore present during the passage of the fallout plume. Thus the modes of exposure of relevance are:
• inhalation of radionuclides in the cloud;
• ingestion of radionuclides in the cloud;
• external exposure to gamma radiation from radionuclides in the cloud (immersion); • external exposure to beta radiation from radionuclides in the cloud (immersion); • external exposure to gamma radiation from material deposited on the ground; • external exposure to beta radiation from material deposited on the ground; • exposure to gamma radiation from material deposited on the skin, and • exposure to beta radiation from material deposited on the skin.
Inhalation and ingestion of radionuclides in the cloud would only have occurred during the passage of the cloud, which would have taken~10-30 minutes. External exposure to gamma and beta radiation from material deposited on the ground, the skin and clothing as the cloud passed through the camp would have continued well after the passage of the cloud.
Ingestion doses from consumption of contaminated food and water would be expected to be negligible due to the short time spent at the camp after the explosion. Doses from ingestion or inhalation of material resuspended in the air after initial deposition would also be expected to be very small, because of the short exposure time.
The possible transfer pathways and modes of exposure are summarised in Figure 2 .
There are three differences in the current assessment from the earlier approach (12, 13) . The first is a modification to the source term by the inclusion of 60 Co produced by neutron activation of 59 Co in the steel in the firing tower. The second is an improvement in the treatment of dispersion by the inclusion of the meteorological dispersion term to allow for the dispersion of the radioactive material as it is carried downwind. The third is the allowance for ground deposition of material in the fallout cloud. Material deposited on the ground could be expected to give a significant contribution to the total dose received by the people at Wallatinna.
The estimated dose rates from material deposited on the ground were normalised against the reported measurements for 1 hour after detonation (17) . This allows for the possibility that the assumptions used in the calculations of the dispersion term may not have been accurate for prevailing conditions at the time of the test. The measurement results are shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 also shows the relationship between the direction of the measured contamination plume and the direction of Wallatinna from the firing point. The assumption used in this study is that the plume was centred on the line from the firing point to Wallatinna. Figure 3 clearly shows that this assumption is justified.
The following sections contain a more detailed analysis of the source term, the dispersion effects and the dose estimates. The full mathematical details are given in the appendices. THE SOURCE TERM Totem 1 was a 'near-surface burst' burst, using a 31 metre mild steel firing tower, with an approximate yield of 10 kT (3) . Therefore, the radionuclides that would be expected to be present in any 'cloud' formed in the atmosphere would be a mixture of fission products, neutron activation products (some from soil and some from vaporised steel in the tower), and unburnt plutonium. There would have been a wide range of particle sizes in the material (debris) injected into the atmosphere by the explosion, and many of the radionuclides would have been attached to this material.
Number of plutonium fissions
The amount of fissionable material that produces 4.18 × 10 12 joules (equivalent to 1 kT of TNT) is 57 grams (18) . Assuming that the yield of the Totem 1 device was 10 kT (which means 570 g of plutonium) gives a figure of 1.44 × 10 24 for the maximum number of 239 Pu fissions that could occur (18) .
Effect of incomplete burnup of plutonium in the bomb
For these calculations it was assumed that 12% of the available 239 Pu underwent fission (13) . Therefore the number of 239 Pu fissions that occurred was 1.72 × 10
23
.
Fission products and yields
The fission yields were estimated using a previously published methodology (13) . The calculations were carried out using a spreadsheet, starting with the Bq/ Bq per 10 4 fissions for each fission product, and converting this value to Bq, using a value of 4.39 Bq of total activity per 10 4 fissions at t = 30 minutes after detonation (13) . The subsequent values of activity concentration in air were calculated using the appropriate decay or ingrowth equation for each radionuclide (see Table 1 for examples). Table 1 is taken from the spreadsheet used in the dose estimates presented in this paper, and shows the activities as a function of time for the most abundant radionuclides (in terms of activity concentration) at 5 hours post-detonation.
As a check on the internal consistency of the calculations, the estimated activities were converted to atoms and summed. The result was 2. . , and provides a useful check on the initial activities used in the dose calculations. It also suggests that the doses calculated in this report may be slightly overestimated.
Activation products ( 60 Co) from the firing tower A nuclear explosion produces large numbers of neutrons. Some of these neutrons can collide with nuclei in the air, in the soil or in any structures close to the point of detonation to produce new nuclei (called activation products). The original calculations referred to earlier (12) did not include the contribution from 59 Co, produced by neutron activation of any 60 Co in the firing towers, because the towers used in the Maralinga tests were made from aluminium rather than steel.
Most steels contain stable cobalt-59 ( 59 Co). In this case a collision of a neutron with a 59 Co nucleus can produce a cobalt-60 ( 60 Co) nucleus.
60
Co is radioactive with a half-life of~5 y. This means that there is a possibility that 60 Co produced by neutron activation could contribute to the dose received by the people at Wallatinna.
The activity of the This was used to calculate the dose contribution from the 60 Co in exactly the same way as for the fission products and unburnt plutonium. The estimated dose contribution from 60 Co was found to be negligible when compared with the estimated dose contribution from the fission products and unburnt plutonium.
A more detailed discussion is given in Appendix A, together with an estimate of the contribution to the total dose received by the people at Wallatinna from exposure to 60 Co produced by neutron activation of the 59 Co in the firing tower. Another possible source of radionuclides in the plume is activation products in the air in the source region (see also Appendix A).
FACTORS AFFECTING RADIONUCLIDE CONCENTRATIONS IN THE PLUME
Several processes affect the plume as it moves through the environment from the point of release to the exposed person. These include dispersion processes, plume rise and decay and ingrowth of radionuclides. The shape of the source region can also affect the doses received at the point of exposure.
Each of these effects can be expressed as a multiplying factor that is applied to the source term to estimate the radionuclide activities at the point of exposure.
A brief outline of each of these processes is given in the following sections. A detailed discussion, together with the relevant mathematical equations, is given in Appendix B.
Line source
A nuclear explosion releases a very large quantity of energy. This causes the formation of a cloud of debris which rises rapidly because of its buoyancy. The effect of this is to produce (to a first approximation) a cylindrical cloud of material of some height L. At distances much larger than the horizontal dimensions of this cloud, the source can be assumed to be a vertical line of length L, with the radionuclides distributed uniformly along this line.
The dose estimates presented in this study are based on the assumption of a line source. The mathematical representation of this source is discussed in Appendix B.
Cylindrical source
The source could be approximated by assuming a cylindrical shape rather than a line. However, it is doubtful whether this complexity is needed, because of the large down-range distance at which the exposures occurred. In addition, if the source is assumed to be a cylinder rather than a line, the footprint of the plume will be wider because of the lateral extent of the source, and the predicted radionuclide concentrations on the axis of the plume will be lower. Therefore, the assumption of a line source is more conservative than the assumption of a cylindrical source.
The dispersion factor
As the cloud produced by the detonation moves downwind, it tends to disperse (spread) horizontally and vertically. This reduces the radionuclide concentrations in the cloud.
Correction of the source term for plume rise
The cloud of hot air and debris produced by a nuclear detonation is highly buoyant and tends to rise to great heights. The method used to allow for this effect is discussed in Appendix B.
Correction for radioactive decay and ingrowth
As the cloud containing radionuclides produced by the detonation moves downwind, some of the radionuclides will undergo radioactive decay. This produces decay products, some of which are radioactive and will themselves subsequently decay.
The method of allowing for these effects is discussed in Appendix B.
ESTIMATED DOSES AT WALLATINNA
The doses that could have been received by the people at Wallatinna were estimated on the centre line of the plume, so they should provide a maximum estimate of the doses that were received.
The following sections contain a summary of the dose contributions from each exposure pathway that was considered. The detailed discussions and derivations of doses for each exposure pathway are presented in Appendix C.
Gamma dose to the skin from immersion
The expression used in the spreadsheet to estimate the gamma dose to the skin (Sv) from immersion in a cloud of radioactive material (derived in Appendix C) is
where L is the height of the cloud at the detonation point (assumed to be 20 km),
) is the dose coefficient for gamma irradiation of the skin due to immersion in the cloud, N is the total number of radionuclides included in the calculation, Q i ′ is the amount of material released (Bq) for the i-th radionuclide in the mixture, x is the downwind distance from the detonation point to Wallatinna (173 km), u is the wind speed, and F i (x/u) is the factor that accounts for decay and ingrowth of the i-th radionuclide.
This expression does not allow for surface deposition (19) . Therefore, the immersion dose will be overestimated.
The wind speed was estimated from the elapsed time (5 hours) between the explosion and the arrival of the cloud at Wallatinna.
The dose coefficients for immersion were taken from published tables (20) . The values of Q i ′ were the same as those used in previous work (13) . The expressions used for F i were the standard solutions for the Bateman equations (21) and took into account both decay and ingrowth processes.
The estimated equivalent dose to the skin from gamma radiation due to immersion in the radioactive cloud (integrated over the passage of the cloud) was~130 μSv.
Gamma dose to the skin from material deposited on the ground
The expression for the gamma dose rate (Sv s −1 ) resulting from material that was deposited on the ground (on the plume centreline) during the passage of the radioactive cloud (derived in Appendix C) is is the dose coefficient for gamma irradiation at a height of 1 metre due to material deposited uniformly on the ground surface, and the remaining variables are as defined in the previous section.
The dose rate to the skin from material deposited on the ground at Wallatinna (i.e. 5 hours after detonation) was estimated (by using this expression in the spreadsheet) to be~47.5 μSv h −1 . Correcting this to 1 hour after detonation gave a value of 0.7 mSv h −1 .
Normalisation of the estimated doses and dose rates to the measured values
Measurements of gamma dose rates from material deposited on the ground by the TOTEM 1 test were reported by Hicks et al.
. The measured dose rate (corrected to 1 hour after detonation) on the plume centreline at a distance of 107.5 miles (173 km) was 450 mR h −1 (4.5 mGy h −1 ). Assuming that the quantity measured was absorbed dose rate, and using the value of 1 for the radiation weighting factor, the measured gamma dose rate to the skin (corrected to 1 hour after detonation) at Wallatinna was 4.5 mSv h −1 . The estimated dose rate from the spreadsheet calculations (corrected to 1 hour after detonation) was 0.7 mSv per hour, which is lower than the measured value by a factor of~6.4. Therefore, the estimated doses and dose rates were normalised to the measured value by multiplying by this factor.
Using this normalising factor, the corrected equivalent dose rate to the skin due to gamma radiation from material deposited on the ground at Wallatinna (5 hours after detonation) was estimated to be~285 µSv per hour. For a 24 hour exposure period this would give an equivalent dose to the skin of 7.0 mSv. The normalising factor also allows the immersion dose to the skin (calculated in the previous section) to be adjusted to take account of the measurements. With this correction, the estimated equivalent dose to the skin from gamma radiation emitted by radionuclides in the cloud (i.e. immersion) was~100 μSv.
Beta dose to the skin from immersion and from material deposited on the ground
The ratio of beta dose (immersion) to gamma dose (immersion) has been estimated previously by Barss et al. (2006) (22) as a function of time following detonation. The results indicate that, 5 hours after detonation, the ratio of beta dose to gamma dose is very close to 10 for material deposited on the ground. Assuming that this ratio is the same for airborne material, the beta doses to the skin from exposure via immersion and from radiation emitted from radionuclides deposited on the ground were estimated by multiplying the corresponding gamma doses by a factor of 10.
No correction was applied to the estimated internal dose resulting from inhalation (see the next section), as the effects of all types of radiation are included in the inhalation dose coefficient.
The calculated gamma (equivalent) dose to the skin from immersion at Wallatinna was~100 µSv. Therefore, the calculated equivalent dose to the skin from beta radiation due to immersion in the radioactive cloud at Wallatinna would have been~1 mSv, and the equivalent dose to the skin due to beta radiation from radionuclides deposited on the ground would have been~70 mSv (for a 24 hour exposure).
Inhalation dose
The dose resulting from inhalation of radionuclides in the cloud
The effective dose rate (Sv s −1 ) at the point (x, 0, z) due to inhalation of radionuclides during the passage of the cloud is given by (see Appendix C)
where K inh,i is the inhalation dose coefficient for the i-th radionuclide (Sv Bq −1 ), B is the breathing rate (m 3 h −1 ), and the other variables have already been defined.
This expression was used in the spreadsheet to estimate the committed effective inhalation dose to the people camped at Wallatinna. Values of K inh,i were taken from the tables in IAEA BSS-115 (23) . A (default) value of 1.2 m 3 h −1 was chosen for the breathing rate.
The estimated committed effective dose from inhalation at Wallatinna due to the passage of the cloud is~350 µSv.
The dose from inhalation of resuspended contaminated dust
The amount of dust that would have been resuspended is a very small fraction of the amount of dust on the ground surface. Typical dust levels in the absence of vehicle activity would have been of the order of 100-300 μg m
−3(24)
. This means that, over a 24 hour period, assuming a breathing rate of 1.2 m 3 h
as before, the amount of dust that would have been inhaled would have been <10 mg. Much of this inhaled dust would have come from upwind, but the small amount means that the inhalation dose would be negligible compared with the dose contributions from other modes of exposure.
Ingestion dose
The dose contribution from the consumption of contaminated food was assumed to be negligible, because of the short exposure time (24 hours), the very low probability that any animals killed for food during the 24-hour period would have been significantly contaminated, and the small amount of contamination that could have occurred in any water drunk during the 24-hour period.
Gamma and beta doses from material deposited on the skin
Immersion in a cloud of radioactive material will cause deposition of radionuclides on the skin and on clothing. The subsequent radioactive decay of these deposited radionuclides can lead to a radiation dose to the skin and other body organs.
The area of skin is much smaller than the ground surface area from which radiation from deposited radionuclides can contribute to the dose to the skin. In addition, radionuclides deposited on the skin will tend to be removed by rubbing processes and other effects such as washing. Therefore, the dose to the skin from radionuclides deposited directly on the skin or on clothing will be much smaller than the dose from radiation emitted by radionuclides deposited on the ground surface.
Total dose estimates
The estimated total doses received by the people camped at Wallatinna bore at the time of the Totem-1 explosion are summarised in Table 2 . The only single tissue for which equivalent dose was calculated was the skin; a tissue weighting factor of 0.01 was used to convert equivalent dose to skin to effective dose.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Estimating the doses that could have been incurred at Wallatinna requires several things, including:
• a model for the downwind transport of radionuclides formed by the nuclear explosion, • knowledge of which radionuclides would have been formed in the explosion, • knowledge of the subsequent radioactive decay of these radionuclides and the ingrowth of any decay products, and • knowledge of the behaviour of the exposed population group.
It has been shown that the radionuclide concentration for a single radionuclide at a downwind distance x from the detonation point and at time t after detonation can be written in the form
where C(x, t) is the radionuclide concentration (Bq m −3 ) at downwind distance x at time t after the detonation, C(0, 0) is the radionuclide concentration (Bq m −3 ) at the point of detonation at time zero, M(x, t) is a factor which accounts for the downwind transport, including dispersion, of the radionuclide, and F(t) is a factor which allows for the radioactive decay or ingrowth of the radionuclide. F(t) is well known (the radioactive decay laws) and C(0,0) has been determined from a large number of measurements associated with nuclear testing. The major uncertainty is associated with the meteorological factor M(x, t). However, this factor is the same for all radionuclides.
The dose received by exposure to beta radiation from material in an airborne cloud or from material deposited on the ground can be calculated by using the estimated concentrations, the appropriate dose conversion factors and the time for which people were exposed.
The gamma radiation dose to the skin from immersion in a cloud of radioactive material has been estimated using a Gaussian plume formula. The same approach has been used to estimate the dose to the skin from radiation emitted from material deposited on the ground surface during the passage of the plume (ground shine), and also to estimate the dose resulting from inhalation of contaminated material during the passage of the plume.
The estimated dose rate from material deposited on the ground during the passage of the plume was normalised to ground measurements taken in the period following the Totem 1 nuclear weapons test. This normalisation helps to remove some of the uncertainties resulting from the modelling of the complex meteorological phenomena associated with the dispersion of the radioactive cloud formed by the nuclear detonation. The dose estimates to skin and from inhalation took this normalisation into account.
The beta doses to the skin from immersion and from ground shine were estimated from the corresponding gamma doses by multiplying by a factor of 10 (22) . The results of the calculations show that the maximum dose that could have been received by the group of people camped at Wallatinna when the Totem 1 nuclear weapons test took place in October 1953 was of the order of 4 mSv. A dose of this magnitude will not lead to any acute health effects.
Conservative assumptions have been used in this work wherever possible, in order to ensure that the doses are not underestimated. For example, the height of the source is assumed to be 20 km, although it could have been more than twice this value. This means that the radionuclide concentrations in the plume will be overestimated. The Gaussian plume model, which was used for these calculations, is consistent with observations of the dispersion of atmospheric plumes as they travel downwind. It is highly unlikely that any physical mechanism would significantly reduce this dispersion. Therefore, the dose estimates made no allowance for any mechanism that might have inhibited the dispersion of the radionuclides in the plume.
This study does not attempt to offer a detailed explanation of the 'black mist' phenomenon. However, one possibility is that the mist was a smoke plume produced by a fire that started as a result of scrub being ignited by hot debris from the fireball. It is noted that the symptoms described in the AIRAC 9 (4) assessment of the black mist, which included sore eyes, loss of sight, skin rashes, coughing, vomiting and diarrhoea are associated with acute exposures to high levels of ionising radiation. However, these symptoms are also associated with measles (5) , and it is recorded that there was a severe measles epidemic in the Wallatinna region in 1948 which resulted in the deaths of a significant number of Aboriginal people (25) . The fear element associated with witnessing the Totem 1 atomic explosion has been acknowledged (5) . Aborigines have given a credible description of the mushroom cloud and associated electrical flashes, hearing its rumbling sound (~8 or 9 minutes later at Wallatinna), and being enveloped in the nastysmelling 'black mist' some 4 or 5 hours later. The backdrop to all this was partial knowledge of what was happening with the atomic testing, enough to probably generate a fear without being sufficient to allay unnecessary alarm (4) . Aboriginal testimony indicates the degree of knowledge that they had gleaned about the technological events that were surprisingly happening in their remote corner of outback Australia in those post-war years (5) . Regardless of speculation regarding these possibilities, the doses due to exposure to ionising radiation estimated in this work are unlikely to have caused the symptoms described by Lennon et al. (14) and acknowledged in the AIRAC report (4) .
CONCLUSIONS
There is no reason to doubt the strong anecdotal evidence that a 'black mist' phenomenon was experienced, around the time of the Totem I nuclear weapons test and probably later on the same morning as the test, by Aborigines who observed the nuclear weapons test in the Wallatinna region. Equally there is no reason to doubt the evidence that these same Aborigines experienced acute and chronic health effects around the same time.
The current study estimated that the upper limit to the radiation dose that would have been received by the people camped at Wallatinna when the Totem 1 test took place would have been of the order of 4 mSv. This is consistent with the conclusions from dose estimates by the AIRAC committee in 1983 (4) . Radiation doses of this magnitude are well below those required to cause acute (i.e. short-term) effects with the symptoms described by Lennon et al. (14) and AIRAC (4) for Aborigines at Wallatinna. On the basis of these radiation dose estimates it is unlikely that radiation exposure from immersion in such a 'black mist' comprised of atomic fallout from the Totem I nuclear test could have caused the reported health effects. This appendix discusses the possibility that activation of material in the firing tower by neutrons produced in the detonation could make a significant contribution to the total doses received by a member of the public. A nuclear explosion produces large numbers of neutrons. Some of these neutrons can collide with nuclei in the air, in the soil or in any structures close to the point of detonation to produce new nuclei (called activation products).
Most steels contain stable cobalt-59 ( where n is the total number of thermal neutrons produced by the detonation, and p a is the probability that a single neutron will produce an activation product.
The number of thermal neutrons is given by
where N F is the total number of fissions; v is the number of neutrons produced per fission, = 2.91 (26) ; and q is the fraction of thermal neutrons, = 0.7 (18) . The probability p a is given by
where p s is the probability that the neutron will pass through the steel in the tower; and p c is the (conditional) probability that a neutron that passes through the steel will produce an activation product. Assuming that the detonation can be treated as a point source of neutrons, the probability that a neutron will pass through the steel in the tower can be taken as the ratio of the volume of steel to the volume of a sphere whose radius is equal to the height of the tower. Therefore where v s is the volume of steel in the tower; and H is the height of the tower.
The probability that a neutron will produce an activation product in the steel in the tower is given by (26, 27) 
where n T is the number of target ( 59 Co) atoms per unit volume in the steel, σ is the cross-sectional area of a nucleus for neutron activation, and L is the thickness of the steel.
The number of target atoms is given by
where N s (atoms cm The number of 239 Pu fissions (N F ) that occurred was 1.7244 × 10 23 . The average number of thermal neutrons emitted per fission of 239 Pu is 2.91 (26) . Since one of these neutrons is absorbed by a 239 Pu atom to maintain the fission process, the number of neutrons per fission available for activation (v) is 1.91.
Glasstone and Dolan (18) suggest that~70% of the neutrons released from a fission weapon are in the low energy range (0 to 1 MeV), so for this work it was assumed that q = 0.7.
The height of the tower was 31 m. The density of steel (M s /V s ) is~7.8 g cm −3 . For thermal neutrons, the absorption crosssection of cobalt is 37.18 × 10 -24 cm 2(28) . Therefore The remaining parameters that have to be determined are the volume of steel in the tower (V s ), the effective thickness of the steel (L) in the tower, and the fraction of 60 Co atoms (f) in the steel. The exact construction of the tower was not known. It was assumed that the construction of the tower was as shown in Figure A1 .
The vertical posts were assumed to be angle iron, 10 cm by 10 cm (1 cm thick). The diagonal braces were assumed to be flat strips, 10 cm wide and 1 cm thick.
With these assumptions, the total volume of the steel is 1.24 m 3 , which corresponds to a mass of 10 tonnes.
For the purposes of the calculations it was also assumed that the steel in the tower was distributed in a thin spherical shell with its centre at the detonation point, and with radius equal to the height of the tower; this means that the thickness of the shell is 0.0001 m or 0.01 cm. This is an extremely crude assumption, but it means that the dose from exposure to the activation products will be overestimated.
Using these results gives The abundance of cobalt in the earth's crust is~25 ppm by mass and~8 ppm by moles (29) . The fraction by weight of cobalt in stainless steel is These results were used in the spreadsheet to calculate the dose contribution from the 60 Co in exactly the same way as for the fission products and unburnt plutonium. The estimated dose contribution from 60 Co was found to be negligible when compared with the estimated dose contribution from the fission products and unburnt plutonium.
Activation products in air
Since the density of air is very much less than that of the steel in the tower, it was assumed that activation products produced in the air would also make a negligible contribution to the total dose received by the people exposed at Wallatinna.
APPENDIX B
Correction factors
Line source
For a line source, the source term Q′ can be replaced by
where δ(x′) is the unit impulse function (or Dirac delta function) (30) . Substituting this expression in, (B.2) integrating with respect to x′ and y′, using the sifting property of the unit impulse function (30) , and then carrying out the integration with respect to z′ (assuming that σ z depends only on t), leads to The effective release height h from a stack of height h r is given by
where h r is the stack height, Q h is the rate of thermal energy discharge (watts), V is the discharge speed (m/s), d is the inside diameter of the stack mouth (m), α = −1.04, and β = 0.071 (assuming stable atmospheric conditions at the detonation point).
Although this is not strictly valid for a nuclear detonation, it can be applied (approximately) by putting d = 0, so that
If it is assumed that all the energy is released in 1 second, then using a figure of 4.18 × 10 12 watts/kT for the energy produced by a nuclear explosion where Y is the bomb power in kT. For a 10 kT bomb, this gives a value of h of 46 000 m.
For the purposes of this exercise, it was assumed that L = 20 000 m.
Correction for radioactive decay and ingrowth Equation (B.4) makes no correction for radioactive decay and ingrowth of decay products. The effect of radioactive decay and ingrowth can be included in equation (B.4) by multiplying by a factor F(t), since the radioactive decay and ingrowth processes and the dispersion processes are independent of each other. Therefore
Using a The Pasquill-Gifford formula for the dispersion parameter σ y is given (for moderately unstable conditions-Pasquill category B) by (19) where x = ut is the distance travelled by the plume in time t, K skin,imm gamma is the dose coefficient, Q′/L is the radionuclide concentration at the source, F(x/u) is the factor that accounts for decay and ingrowth of the parent radionuclide and decay products, and π ( ) = (( ) ) P x x 1/ 2 1/2 is the factor that accounts for dispersion in the cloud as it moves downwind.
Since Wallatinna is 173 km from the detonation point and the cloud is assumed to rise to 20 km This does not allow for surface deposition (19) . Therefore, the immersion dose will be overestimated.
This expression was used in the spreadsheet described earlier, to estimate the dose to the skin from immersion in a cloud of radioactive material. Using published dose coefficients (20) and Q′ i values (12) and the decay and ingrowth factors (F i ) given by equation (C.1), the estimated equivalent dose to the skin from gamma radiation due to immersion in the radioactive cloud (integrated over the passage of the cloud) was~16 μSv.
Gamma dose to the skin from material deposited on the ground
The maximum activity concentration in air (C max (x, y, z, t)) is on the plume centreline, and is given by putting y = 0 in equation (B.9).
The maximum downward flux (Bq m −2 s −1 ) at the ground surface is then given by v d C(x, y, 0, t), where v d is the deposition velocity. Therefore, the maximum rate at which activity is deposited on the ground surface (Bq m −2 s −1 ) is This expression was used in the spreadsheet to estimate the committed effective inhalation dose to the people camped at Wallatinna. Values of K inh,i were taken from IAEA Safety Series No. 115 (23) . A (default) value of 1.2 m 3 h −1 was chosen for the breathing rate.
The estimated committed effective dose from inhalation at Wallatinna due to the passage of the cloud is~2.25 mSv.
Ingestion dose
The dose contribution from the consumption of contaminated food was assumed to be negligible, because of the short exposure time (24 hours), the very low probability that the meat from any animals killed for food during the 24-hour period would have been significantly contaminated, and the small amount of contamination that could have occurred in any water drunk during the 24-hour period.
